Executive summary
Russia's war economy shows mounting stress as frontline casualties run at an estimated 35,000–40,000 per month and recruitment falls 20 percent year-on-year, while a CSIS panel confirmed China's structural unwillingness to constrain North Korea and a concurrent CSIS war-game session found South Korea facing inescapable trade-offs in any Taiwan contingency. Across all three theaters, the common thread is accelerating strategic competition among major powers with diminishing space for diplomatic off-ramps.
Key takeaways
- Russia's war effort faces simultaneous attrition on three fronts — military, economic, and social: frontline casualties of 35,000–40,000 per month exceed replacement capacity per CSIS analysts; recruitment fell at least 20 percent year-on-year to roughly 800 soldiers per day in Q1 2026 per Militarnyi; refinery output hit a 17-year low of 4.69 million barrels per day; and VCIOM itself reports Putin's approval has dropped 10–12 points to 65–66 percent, suggesting the rally-around-the-flag effect identified by both CSIS analysts and the Levada Center is eroding.
- China's refusal to meaningfully constrain North Korea — documented across three consecutive administrations and confirmed by a CSIS panel including former CIA and NSC officials — has solidified alongside a June 2024 Russia-DPRK mutual defense pact that Victor Cha of CSIS assessed has effectively ended both Moscow's and Beijing's interest in denuclearization; the result is a structurally more dangerous peninsula in which the United States, per Cha, represents 'the largest variable in the regional equation,' and in which any Taiwan contingency carries unavoidable Korean Peninsula entanglement.
- The Trump administration's simultaneous pursuit of troop withdrawals from Germany exceeding 5,000 — with potential withdrawals from Italy and Spain — and a Beijing summit tracking possible concessions on Taiwan arms sales worth up to $14 billion (the pending second tranche of a $25 billion package) creates compounding credibility deficits across two theaters, a dynamic former NSC official Bryza assessed could increase Putin's incentive for sub-threshold aggression against Baltic NATO members and that CSIS panelists assessed could permanently alter the terms of U.S. extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
Russia: Public Opinion Shifts, Economic Strain, and the Attrition Calculus
**Approval erosion.** According to Dr. Sam Green, Professor of Russian Politics at King's College London, speaking on the CSIS *Russian Roulette* podcast recorded May 8, 2026, Levada Center polling shows the share of Russians who believe the country is heading in the right direction has fallen well below pre-invasion levels. Kremlin-affiliated pollster VCIOM has separately reported a decline of approximately 10 to 12 percentage points in Putin's approval rating, with approval now reportedly at 65 to 66 percent, according to Maria Snegovaya, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at CSIS. Snegovaya drew a parallel to the post-2014 Crimea annexation period, during which elevated approval held for approximately 4 years before eroding — suggesting a similar arc may now be under way. **Casualty and recruitment data.** Green stated that Russian frontline casualties are running at an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 per month, which he described as above the replacement rate. That assessment is reinforced by battlefield data cited in *The Military Show* transcript: Ukraine's Ministry of Defense claimed 35,351 Russian casualties in March 2026 — 96 percent recorded by drone according to Al Jazeera — and a further 35,203 in April. Russian independent outlets Meduza and Mediazona, in a May 9 joint publication, confirmed at least 352,000 Russian men aged 18–59 killed since the war began, based on probate registry checks. United24 Media reported on May 4 that April was the fifth consecutive month in which Russia failed to recruit enough volunteers to offset losses. Militarnyi reported Russia recruited approximately 800 soldiers per day during Q1 2026, down from 1,000–1,200 per day during the same period in 2025, representing a decline of at least 20 percent. **Economic conditions.** Green, on the CSIS podcast, assessed that Russia has been unable to generate meaningful economic growth for approximately 12 to 13 years, aside from a limited period of war-Keynesianism. He cited salaries stagnating or falling and reports of salary arrears, with prices continuing to rise. Matthew Bryza, described as a former U.S. National Security Council official, speaking on the *warandpolitics24* channel, added that Russian banks have been directed by the Kremlin to extend loans to the defense sector that frequently cannot be repaid, and that interest rates have been raised to combat high inflation, weighing on investment. The *Jason Jay Smart* transcript cited a Russian federal budget deficit of $73 billion, Russian refining output at approximately 4.69 million barrels per day — described as the lowest reported level since 2009 — and six refineries reported disrupted in April and early May, attributed to Ukrainian strikes. **Territorial and battlefield outcome.** The Institute for the Study of War, cited in *The Military Show* transcript, reported that April 2026 produced Russia's first net territorial loss inside Ukraine since Ukraine's summer counteroffensive of 2023, with Ukraine recording a net gain of 120 square kilometers by month's end. DeepState reported Russia took 672 square kilometers during the spring period, trailing the 827 square kilometers seized during the comparable period in 2025, according to the Kyiv Independent. The National Interest reported approximately 10,000 Russian casualties in the first week of the renewed spring offensive, including a single-day loss of 1,710 soldiers on March 17, described as the highest single-day figure recorded in 2026. **Technology shift.** The Kyiv Independent and Politico are cited in *The Military Show* as reporting that drones now account for up to 80 percent of battlefield casualties. Ukraine's use of first-person-view drones enables strikes at approximately 10 percent of the cost of a single artillery shell against a static position, per the same reporting. The Center for European Policy Analysis assessed that ground robotic systems could reduce Ukraine's frontline infantry requirements by 30 percent by end-2026. The Associated Press separately reported that Ukrainian drone operators effectively neutralized Swedish forces during NATO exercises on Gotland island, compelling the Swedish side to halt exercises 3 times and revise tactics. **Negotiation posture.** Russian presidential spokesman Peskov, cited in the *warandpolitics24* channel, stated Russia is prepared to restart peace talks only if Ukraine orders its armed forces to cease fire and withdraw from the Donbas and other designated Russian territorial regions. Bryza assessed that Yuri Ushakov framed the May 9 ceasefire proposal as a Trump initiative to re-engage U.S. mediation, and that Ushakov's subsequent withdrawal threat was a tactical maneuver to pressure Washington into pressing Kyiv on territorial concessions. Green, on the CSIS podcast, described continued attritional warfare as his baseline scenario for the next 12 months, and assessed that European long-term commitment to Ukraine — including a $90 billion commitment cited by Max Bergman, Director of the Stuart Center at CSIS — paradoxically increases the probability of an earlier end to the conflict, because Russian strategy is predicated on European patience exhausting first. **Internet crackdown and elite dynamics.** Bergman described widespread internet outages in Moscow and St. Petersburg, an FSB-led crackdown on Telegram and VPNs, and efforts to push users toward a Russian state-affiliated messaging application called Max. Snegovaya raised reporting of a feud between Defense Minister Belousov and Presidential Administration official Kiriyenko over United Russia's electoral lists ahead of Duma elections — specifically over which figures linked to the special military operation would receive parliamentary seats. Green assessed that intra-elite competition is primarily over rents, not ideology, and noted ongoing arrests in the Defense Ministry. Denis Butsaev, described as a former Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, reportedly fled to the United States following dismissal on corruption charges, though Green declined to characterize this as a politically motivated elite defection.
Russia's Strategic Weapons: Sarmat Setbacks and Nuclear-Transfer Allegations
**Sarmat missile program.** The *Jason Jay Smart* transcript reported that Russia conducted a test launch of its Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, described as only the second successful launch since development began, following a launch-site explosion in 2024. Russia has promoted the Sarmat since at least 2018 as capable of carrying nuclear warheads over distances exceeding 35,000 kilometers. Alexander Gavloof, identified as director of the Sarmat production facility referred to as Cross Mos, was detained on embezzlement charges on the same day a new Russian air force commander was appointed — an officer whose career background was in armored vehicles, per the same transcript. At least 12 hypersonic aerodynamic specialists have faced treason charges in Russia since 2018, per the same reporting; two scientists identified as Zeans and Galin each received sentences of 12.5 years, with additional scientists sentenced to 15 years and 14 years respectively. **Alleged nuclear-component transfer to North Korea.** CNN's May 12 investigation, as reported in *The Military Show* transcript, found that the Russian cargo ship Ursa Major sank on December 23, 2024, approximately 60 miles off the coast of Spain following a series of explosions; Russia's Foreign Ministry attributed the incident to an engine-room explosion, per BBC reporting on December 24, 2024. The vessel, a sanctioned ship previously known as Sparta 3, had departed St. Petersburg 12 days prior, publicly listed as bound for Vladivostok with a manifest citing two large cranes and 129 empty shipping containers. Two crew members were killed; 14 survivors were rescued by Spanish authorities, per CNN. CNN reported the ship's captain, Igor Anisimov, told Spanish investigators under questioning that the Ursa Major was transporting components for two submarine nuclear reactors — which Anisimov stated contained no fuel — and that he believed Vladivostok was a cover for a North Korea delivery. Satellite photographs of Ust-Luga port taken around the time of loading showed two white pill-shaped objects CNN assessed were consistent with VM-4SG reactor pressure vessels; those objects were absent from photographs taken approximately one week later, per CNN. The ship held a license to carry nuclear materials. Spain's investigation concluded a supercavitating Barracuda-type torpedo was responsible, based on a 50-by-50-centimeter inward-facing hull breach. However, Mike Plunkett, Senior Naval Platforms Analyst at Janes, offered a competing assessment to CNN, stating the damage was consistent with a limpet mine or shaped charge. CNN noted nations possessing Barracuda-type torpedoes include Russia, the United States, and several NATO states, with Germany as the original developer; approximately 12 units were reportedly produced but the weapon never entered official procurement. The Pentagon, Spanish, and UK authorities all declined comment. Ship owner Oboronlogistics characterized the incident as a 'targeted terrorist attack.' The United States deployed WC-135R nuclear-detection aircraft to the wreck site on August 28, 2025, and again on February 6, 2026, per CNN. Russian vessel Yantar returned to the site approximately one week after the sinking; four additional seabed explosions were subsequently detected, per the New Voice of Ukraine on May 13. **North Korea nuclear-submarine context.** The Center for Strategic and International Studies, cited in *The Military Show*, reported North Korea announced a goal of developing a nuclear-powered submarine in 2021 as part of a five-year weapons plan, with Kim Jong-un reiterating the desire during the January 2024 testing of a submarine-launched cruise missile.
Northeast Asia: China's North Korea Calculus and the Taiwan Contingency
**China's structural role on the peninsula.** A CSIS panel on May 15, convened under the title 'Has China Been Helpful on North Korea?', reached a consensus negative verdict. Chong Park, distinguished associate fellow at the Free University of Brussels and former senior CIA official, stated Beijing's role has been 'incredibly unhelpful.' Patricia Kim, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center, reframed the question: China has been indispensable not to resolving the North Korea problem but to North Korea's survival, serving as Pyongyang's principal patron, primary military ally, economic lifeline, and diplomatic shield. She attributed this posture not to ideological alignment but to Beijing's desire to preserve sphere-of-influence control over a strategically critical peninsula. **Historical pattern.** CSIS moderator Sid outlined that Chinese cooperation has historically emerged only when Beijing feared being sidelined by US-DPRK diplomacy or perceived imminent U.S. escalation — citing the 2002–2003 post-'axis of evil' period and the 2017 'fire and fury' period, when Beijing supported UN Security Council sanctions resolutions. Chong Park noted that following the 2010 Cheonan attack, which killed 46 South Korean sailors, and the Yeonpyeong Island attack, which killed 4 South Koreans, China called for restraint without assigning responsibility to Pyongyang. **Biden-era rejection of North Korea requests.** Rush Toshi, CV Starr Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former NSC Deputy Senior Director for China and Taiwan, stated that every time the Biden White House raised North Korea with China — at the presidential level or below — the Chinese side declined serious discussion and blamed the United States. He identified 3 specifically rejected requests: deniable US-China cooperation on COVID vaccine delivery to North Korea; brokering more substantive US-DPRK communication; and coordination on the nuclear program. China's response to concerns about Russian DPRK involvement was, in Toshi's characterization, essentially 'what can we do about it.' **Russia-DPRK pact and its constraining effect on Beijing.** Kim stated that following the signing of a Russia-DPRK mutual defense pact in June 2024, Beijing noticeably intensified outreach to North Korea, including a red-carpet reception for Kim Jong-un. Victor Cha of CSIS stated in closing remarks that China and Russia have effectively accepted North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, moving away from any genuine interest in denuclearization. Cha assessed that Russian influence over the DPRK is worse for U.S. interests than Chinese influence because China opposes a seventh North Korean nuclear test while Russia, in his assessment, does not. The CSIS moderator noted internally that the Russia-DPRK relationship could represent 5 to 10 years of strategic value to Russia if sustained. **Beijing's silence on current diplomatic overtures.** Sun Mencho, associate professor at Sungkyunkwan University, noted that the Korean Peninsula was entirely absent from China's official statement at the Two Sessions this year, whereas it had been present the prior year. He assessed that Beijing is deliberately waiting for Seoul and Washington to become more dependent on Chinese facilitation, rather than being genuinely uncertain how to respond. **Taiwan contingency and South Korean constraints.** A concurrent CSIS panel on South Korea's role in a Taiwan conflict, moderated by Henry Edelson, found structural dilemmas that no Seoul government can fully resolve. Mark Canian, Senior Adviser at CSIS, described a war-gaming project that ran approximately 70 games; in 19 of 25 games, China attacked Japan, drawing Tokyo into the conflict. Sunman Cho, associate professor at Sungkyunkwan University, assessed that 90 percent of South Korean trade flows through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, per Andrew Yeo, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Cho assessed that full South Korean non-participation risks economic coercion if China prevails, while full combat participation invites Chinese strikes on South Korean bases and risks North Korean opportunistic aggression expanding the front to the Korean Peninsula. **Lee Jae-myung's strategic ambiguity.** Cho noted that President Lee stated during the 2024 legislative elections that a Taiwan contingency 'had nothing to do with South Korea,' but declined to answer the same question directly when asked by Time magazine after taking office, saying he would consider it 'if aliens invaded the earth.' Cho assessed this shift to strategic ambiguity benefits China, which South Korea requires as an interlocutor for inter-Korean dialogue. **Arms sales to Taiwan and the Trump-Xi summit.** Jason Shu, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and former Taiwanese legislator, stated his government was tracking two specific outcomes from President Trump's Beijing summit: whether Trump would shift U.S. language from 'not supporting' to 'opposing' Taiwan independence, and whether Trump would delay the second tranche of a defense package worth a total of $25 billion — $11 billion approved in January 2026, $14 billion pending. Canian separately raised public discussion of a possible arrangement in which China receives some voice on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for assistance in the Strait of Hormuz. He assessed such a deal would be harmful to Taiwan and would set a precedent affecting allied deployments. Cho, referencing a March 2026 Office of the Director of National Intelligence annual threat assessment, stated the DNI assessed China is unlikely to invade Taiwan by 2027, citing PLA readiness concerns linked to ongoing anti-corruption purges. **Polling on Taiwan defense willingness.** Cho cited polling indicating approximately 67 percent of Taiwan's general population would fight if China invades, but only 31 percent of those in their 20s and 30s said they would fight to the death. A 2024 Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll found 18 percent of American respondents supported direct U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan contingency, 60 percent opposed, and approximately 20 percent undecided, per Cho's account. **Blockade energy vulnerability.** Canian assessed that Taiwan maintains roughly 6 months of food inventory but that natural gas would be exhausted after approximately 2 to 3 weeks of blockade. Shu added that discussions with Korea and Japan have taken place regarding a potential LNG supply-swap arrangement involving Alaska LNG infrastructure to resupply U.S. military bases and sustain Taiwan's energy supply during a blockade scenario.
U.S.-South Africa: Fractured Relations and the Limits of Ambassador Diplomacy
**Structural state of bilateral relations.** The Foreign Policy Research Institute's Africa Program convened a panel on the arrival of U.S. Ambassador Brent Bosel in Pretoria. Bob Wesa, from the Africa Center for the Study of the U.S. in Johannesburg, assessed that relations are unlikely to return to prior warmth, characterizing Bosel's task as preventing a complete breakdown rather than restoring closeness. Wesa noted that China-South Africa trade volume is nearly double that of U.S.-South Africa trade, and that more than 600 companies registered with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce operate in South Africa. **Five Trump administration priorities — none achieved.** Michael Walsh, identified as being at the University of Alaska, outlined five stated priorities the Trump administration set for Bosel: reducing South Africa's relationship with Iran; addressing the 'kill the Boer' song as hate speech; challenging broad-based black economic empowerment laws as they affect U.S. companies; contesting land expropriation without compensation legislation; and advancing the administration's framing on what it calls white genocide, which Walsh said the administration has sought to reframe as rural violence. Walsh assessed that Bosel has not achieved clear progress on any of these 5 objectives to date. **White Afrikaner refugee issue and Elon Musk's influence.** Panelist David Monet described the Trump administration's position on granting refugee status to white Afrikaner South Africans as 'unfortunate,' attributing it in part to the influence of South African-born businessman Elon Musk. Wesa noted that even the Democratic Alliance — generally aligned with U.S. positions — has not endorsed refugee status for white South Africans, and observed that crime in South Africa disproportionately affects Black South Africans. **G20 disinvitation.** Walsh described South Africa's exclusion from the G20 summit to be held at the U.S. president's golf resort in Miami as retaliatory, stating South Africa had an opportunity at the G20 it hosted the prior year to address Trump administration priorities and chose not to. Walsh assessed the Ramaphosa government has larger strategic priorities than securing a summit invitation. **South Africa's new ambassador and Pretoria's posture.** Wesa assessed the nomination of Roelf Meyer — a central negotiator at the CODESA talks alongside President Cyril Ramaphosa in the early 1990s — as South Africa's new Washington ambassador as a wise choice given the state of fractured relations. Monet noted that South Africa's decision not to reject Bosel's credentials, despite having grounds to do so, demonstrated Pretoria's willingness to reset the relationship. **Iran and the ICJ.** Wesa described South Africa's position on Iran as more nuanced than commonly presented, supporting Iran on sanctions matters while being critical on human rights. He discussed an incident involving Iran's participation in South African naval exercises as revealing a coordination weakness — with the presidency reportedly opposed to Iranian participation while the defense establishment proceeded regardless. Walsh noted that South Africa's ICJ action against Israel has led some U.S. advocates to call for South Africa to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism, and that South Africa's former ambassador to Washington, Rasul, was declared persona non grata by the Trump administration for remarks it characterized as interference in U.S. internal affairs. Walsh also noted that Malaysia — another participant in the ICJ Hague group — has not faced equivalent U.S. pressure, which he linked to a critical minerals agreement between the U.S. and Malaysia.
NATO Cohesion: U.S. Troop Withdrawals and European Defense Posture
**U.S. troop withdrawal signals.** Matthew Bryza, speaking on *warandpolitics24*, stated that President Trump has announced plans to withdraw significantly more than 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany and is considering withdrawals from Italy and Spain, which Trump has linked to those countries' refusal to support U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran. Bryza assessed these moves undermine the credibility of NATO's Article 5 mutual defense commitment, weaken transatlantic solidarity, and reduce U.S. leverage with Russia in any prospective Ukraine settlement. He specifically identified Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as potential targets for sub-threshold Russian military actions modeled on the 2014 Crimea playbook, were NATO deterrence to erode. **European commitment to Ukraine.** Max Bergman, Director of the Stuart Center in Europe-Russia-Eurasia Program at CSIS, noted on the May 8 podcast that European states have committed $90 billion to Ukraine and that Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán's blockage of EU funds has ended. A speaker at what the *warandpolitics24* channel described as a Bucharest NATO summit stated that the European support package of $90 billion is expected to be operational no later than early June, with an initial tranche directed toward drone production. The same speaker called for the opening of the first EU membership cluster for Ukraine and expressed uncertainty about the outcome of the NATO summit scheduled in Turkey in July, citing existing difficulties in U.S.-Europe relations. **Learning from Ukraine.** According to the *warandpolitics24* channel, a U.S. Senator identified as Pete Hackett stated at a U.S. Senate hearing that American soldiers are incorporating knowledge gained from Ukrainian battlefield experience into U.S. military defense strategy. A senior unnamed Pentagon official at the same hearing said the department's vision is to develop 'real capable allies and partners' rather than maximize the number of national flags involved in operations, citing Israel's air force as a model. **EU defense institutional development.** Dr. Green, on the CSIS podcast, noted that Andrius Kubilius, the Lithuanian official serving as the European Union's first Commissioner for Defense, has been among the voices arguing for keeping doors open to Russian exiles — an indication that the EU's newly established defense portfolio is engaging with questions of Russia's long-term political trajectory. Green assessed that Europe, rather than the United States, is the more credible source of messaging toward the Russian public, given geographic proximity and relative foreign policy consistency, but that Europe has not yet reached internal consensus on the future it wishes to see for Russia.
Sources
- CSIS Russian Roulette podcast, May 8, 2026 (Dr. Sam Green, King's College London; Max Bergman, CSIS; Maria Snegovaya, CSIS)
- The Military Show — Russia/Ursa Major sinking investigation (citing CNN May 12 investigation, BBC December 24 2024, New Voice of Ukraine May 13, United24 Media, Janes/Mike Plunkett, Center for Strategic and International Studies)
- The Military Show — Ukraine battlefield overview (citing National Interest, DeepState, Kyiv Independent, Institute for the Study of War, Al Jazeera, Ukraine Ministry of Defense, Meduza/Mediazona May 9, United24 Media May 4 and May 10, Militarnyi, Center for European Policy Analysis, Politico)
- warandpolitics24 — Matthew Bryza interview (former U.S. NSC official)
- warandpolitics24 — Kremlin nuclear drills/peace talks (citing Associated Press, Ukrainian Parliamentary Commissioner Lubinets, Russian spokesman Peskov)
- CSIS panel: 'Has China Been Helpful on North Korea?' (Chong Park, Free University of Brussels/former CIA; Patricia Kim, Brookings; Sun Mencho, Sungkyunkwan University; Rush Toshi, CFR/former NSC; Victor Cha, CSIS)
- CSIS panel: 'What Should Be Korea's Role in a Taiwan Conflict?' (Mark Canian, CSIS; Sunman Cho, Sungkyunkwan University; Jason Shu, Hudson Institute; Andrew Yeo, Brookings; moderator Henry Edelson, CSIS)
- Foreign Policy Research Institute Africa Program panel (Bob Wesa, Africa Center for the Study of the U.S.; Michael Walsh, University of Alaska; David Monet)
- Jason Jay Smart — Russian military/economic conditions (citing refinery output data, Sarmat program reporting)