Executive summary
The Iran-U.S. military confrontation has entered a fragile post-strike diplomatic phase after 38 days of bombing, while the Russia-Ukraine war enters a period of Ukrainian strategic momentum marked by unprecedented long-range drone operations reaching St. Petersburg and Moscow. According to Victor Davis Hanson (Hoover Institution), Iran has lost an estimated half-trillion dollars in accumulated military and industrial investment, while Institute for the Study of War data cited across multiple sources confirms Russia lost net territorial control of approximately 177 square kilometres in the first five months of 2026. A bipartisan U.S. House war powers resolution and a reported $9 billion Ukraine aid package have passed the lower chamber, though both face uncertain Senate prospects.
Key takeaways
- The U.S.-Iran post-strike diplomatic framework has collapsed: IRGC ballistic missile strikes on Kuwait International Airport on June 3rd — causing 1 fatality and 63 injuries per unattributed figures in the Hanson interview — formally ended the ceasefire, while Iran's insistence on linking Hezbollah's Lebanon position to nuclear talks reflects a deteriorating leverage position as Hamas is assessed as 'basically finished' and the Houthis significantly deterred.
- Ukraine has achieved a net territorial gain of approximately 177 square kilometres in the first five months of 2026 (104 km gained versus 281 km lost by Russia), while long-range drone operations now reach St. Petersburg, Moscow refineries, and Siberian oil infrastructure — and the rocket-armed FP-2 drone represents a qualitative escalation that directly counters Russia's last viable low-cost air defense layer, the mobile fire group network.
- Russia's domestic foundations are eroding simultaneously on economic, political, and information fronts: GDP contracted 0.3 percent in Q1 2026, VTsIOM trust in Putin fell 12.2 percentage points to 65.6 percent between December 2025 and April 2026, arms export revenue dropped 64 to 92 percent over 2021-2026 depending on the analytical source, and the Ganges water treaty expiration on December 12, 2026 and Bangladesh-India extradition impasse represent separate but structurally similar patterns of unresolved post-transition diplomatic friction.
Iran: Post-Strike Diplomacy Fractures, Gulf Escalation Resumes
The U.S.-Iran confrontation has moved through at least three distinct phases since hostilities began: a 38-day bombing campaign, a nearly 50-day negotiating window, and what the transcript from the Victor Davis Hanson interview characterises as renewed IRGC offensive action. According to the Hanson interview on the Jill Michaels program, on June 3rd the IRGC launched ballistic missiles and drones targeting Kuwait and Bahrain, with multiple projectiles penetrating air defenses and striking the passenger terminal at Kuwait International Airport, resulting in one fatality and 63 injuries — though those casualty figures are attributed solely to the host and carry no independent institutional citation. Iran framed the June 3rd strikes as a formal declaration that the ceasefire with the United States was 'completely off,' citing as provocation a prior Persian Gulf skirmish involving a downed U.S. drone and subsequent U.S. retaliatory strikes on Iran's Kharg Island, per the Hanson interview. Crucially, the IRGC directed its missiles at Gulf States hosting U.S. military bases rather than at U.S. forces directly — a distinction Hanson characterised as reflecting Iran's limited remaining direct-action options. In late May, President Trump had announced what senior officials described as an 'agreement in principle,' under which Iran would dispose of its enriched uranium stockpiles in exchange for the U.S. lifting its naval blockade and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, according to the Hanson interview. That framework collapsed when Iran suspended peace talks, citing escalating Israel-Hezbollah fighting in Lebanon as its stated pretext. Trump subsequently called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and, per an Axios report cited in the Hanson transcript, acknowledged describing Netanyahu as 'crazy,' suggesting the administration blamed Israeli operations for undermining the diplomatic track. Peace talks were described as 'on life support' at the time of recording. Hanson assessed Iran's leverage as severely degraded: Hamas is described as 'basically finished,' the Houthis as 'significantly deterred' following Israeli and American warnings, leaving Hezbollah and Strait of Hormuz harassment as Iran's last two active cards. Hanson cited Iranian economic losses of approximately $400 million in daily oil output and described gasoline queues 'three or four miles long in some cases' and food shortages inside the country, figures he attributed to no named institutional source. He stated that Iranian accounts are frozen and placed the cumulative loss of nuclear, industrial, and military investment over 50 years at approximately half a trillion dollars. Condoleezza Rice, identified in both the Hanson interview and a separate commentary transcript (YouTube Video PzPsnwI-3ns) as director of the Hoover Institution, is cited in both sources as having written that the United States has done more damage to the Iranian regime than any actor in 50 years — a notable assessment given that both sources characterise her as a critic of the Trump administration rather than a partisan supporter. Neither transcript reproduces her analysis directly nor names the publication. On energy markets, Hanson cited approximately 200 tankers positioned across the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Gulf, each carrying between one million and two million barrels — representing roughly five days of global oil supply — as a buffer preventing acute market disruption. He noted incremental production increases of approximately 300,000 additional barrels from Russia, up to 300,000 from Venezuela, and approximately 500,000 from expanded U.S. output, with U.S. production described as close to 14 million barrels per day. Oil prices were reported near $100 per barrel at time of recording, attributed to market uncertainty rather than acute supply shock. Former White House press secretary Sean Spicer, interviewed on the Rubin Report, cited a 14-cent decline in U.S. domestic gasoline prices in the prior week, attributing it to the administration's Iran strategy, though he cited no external source. The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bipartisan concurrent resolution on June 4th to constrain Trump's war powers, with four Republicans crossing party lines, per the Hanson interview. House Speaker Mike Johnson warned the vote would weaken Trump's negotiating leverage. Hanson assessed the resolution as carrying limited practical effect, arguing that the 38-day bombing campaign has concluded and any new military action would effectively reset the statutory 60-day clock. He cited Bill Clinton's 72-day bombing campaign in Serbia and Barack Obama's seven-month campaign in Libya as precedents in which neither administration sought nor received War Powers Act authorisation.
Russia-Ukraine: Ukrainian Strategic Momentum, Russian Domestic Strain
The war in Ukraine has entered what multiple sources describe as a period of measurable Ukrainian advantage, marked by a reversal of Russian territorial momentum, unprecedented long-range strike operations, and deepening Russian economic and manpower strain. **Battlefield Dynamics** According to the Institute for the Study of War, cited in the Source 3 transcript, Russia was advancing approximately seven square miles of Ukrainian territory per day in December 2025. By February 2026, that momentum had reversed, with Ukraine recording net territorial gains for the first time since July 2023. Reporting from Dr. Jason Smart (Kyiv Post special correspondent), cited in Source 5, provides more granular first-half 2026 data: Russian forces gained 104 square kilometres — approximately 40 square miles — while losing control of approximately 281 square kilometres, approximately 109 square miles, in the first five months of the year. That net deficit of 177 square kilometres represents a strategic inversion. Smart's reporting further describes Russian attrition in stark comparative terms: Russia's current loss density is approximately 77 percent of the casualty density recorded at the Battle of the Somme (cited at 1,852 casualties per square kilometre), approximately 12 percent below the density recorded at Avdiivka (1,627 casualties per square kilometre), approximately 40 percent below the density at Bakhmut (2,400 casualties per square kilometre), and nearly 19 times that of Germany's 1918 Operation Michael (77 casualties per square kilometre). Nearly eight Russian military transport vehicles are being destroyed per hour, per the same reporting. General Syrsky is cited in Smart's reporting as identifying approximately 140,000 Russian troops deployed in the direction of Huliaipole and Oleksandrivka, most described as lacking basic supplies, with Russia's 36th Army specifically reported to be rationing artillery shells and compelling civilians and commercial vehicles to transport fuel. Robert 'Madyar' Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, is quoted across Sources 3 and 10 as stating that drones represent 2 percent of Ukraine's military but account for one-third of all targets destroyed — a force-multiplication ratio without modern precedent. **Long-Range Drone Operations** Ukraine conducted several of the most consequential drone operations of the war during the reporting period. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense stated that the Moscow region experienced its largest drone attack since the start of the full-scale invasion on the night of May 17th, 2026, per Source 4. Ukrainian officials stated this was the first time Ukrainian forces had successfully struck the Moscow oil refinery in Capotnia, the Sonichorsk fuel base, and several microelectronics production facilities — targets previously considered heavily protected by Russian air defense. In mid-May, Ukraine launched 600 long-range drones at Moscow in what Source 3 describes as one of the largest such attacks of the war. A separate Ukrainian drone strike travelled over 1,000 kilometres — approximately 620 miles — into Russian territory, prompting evacuation orders on the outskirts of St. Petersburg and reporting a fire at the Kronstadt naval arsenal, per Source 5. Source 11 corroborates and expands this account: the Astro Telegram channel reported a major fire in Kronstadt, which hosts the Baltic Fleet naval base and the Kronstadt Marine plant; drones also targeted the village of Libye in the Leningrad region, reportedly striking an ammunition depot identified as the Navis 15 arsenal. Leningrad Governor Alexander Drozdanov claimed 88 drones were intercepted while acknowledging the raid was ongoing; St. Petersburg Mayor Alexander Beglov officially confirmed a large-scale attack. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova notably did not acknowledge the strikes publicly, instead posting an image of a sunny sky over St. Petersburg on Telegram, per Source 11. The St. Petersburg strikes were timed to coincide with the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum — described by Atlantic Council editor Peter Dickinson (Source 15) as 'Putin's Davos.' Dickinson assessed this targeting as potentially one of the most significant symbolic attacks of the entire war. CNN, cited in Source 15, highlighted that Zelensky's open letter to Putin was released simultaneously with Putin's forum press conference and one day after the St. Petersburg strikes, with The New York Times describing the move as a public relations effort aimed at U.S. President Trump. Separately, a fire broke out at the Antipinsky oil refinery in Tyumen, Siberia — described in Source 11 as one of Russia's largest privately owned refineries, with designed capacity exceeding 9 million tons of crude oil per year — though exact cause remained unconfirmed. Source 3 notes Ukraine struck at least 21 of Russia's 38 refineries in the prior year. **Ukrainian Drone Technology: The Rocket-Armed FPV Advance** Source 10 (The Military Show) provides detailed reporting on Ukraine's fielding of rocket-armed long-range strike drones. The primary platform is the FP-2, manufactured by Ukrainian company Fire Point, designed to carry a warhead of up to 220 pounds, operate at a range of approximately 230 miles, and transmit live video. In the new rocket configuration, the drone carries eight S-5 57-millimetre Soviet-era rockets across two four-rocket pylons alongside a reduced primary warhead. The S-8 80-millimetre variant, entering service in 1984, is also being fielded, with a baseline shaped-charge warhead capable of penetrating up to 400 millimetres of rolled homogeneous armour. Commander Brovdi announced in mid-May 2026 that rockets were being deployed from Ukrainian long-range drones at operational depths of up to 310 miles, per Source 10. Separately, late May 2026 reporting cited in the same source suggested FP-2s had been upgraded to carry a 400-pound warhead at the same 230-mile range. Fire Point co-founder Denys Shtilerman acknowledged his company could produce such capability without directly confirming the FP-2 designation. A confirmed combat application occurred approximately one week after the first open-source footage emerged, when an FP-2 struck what the transcript describes as a strategic communications hub of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The rocket arming is a direct tactical response to Russia's mobile fire group network — armed interception teams positioned along drone approach corridors — itself a response to the failure of Russia's electronic warfare layering, which employed the densest GPS, radio-frequency, and broadband jamming environment in modern history, per Source 10. Ukraine countered jamming with fiber-optic FPV drones carrying control signals as pulses of light through cables thinner than a human hair — a system with no radio-frequency signature for jamming to detect. NATO's Allied Transformation Command formally acknowledged it had no existing solution for fiber-optic FPV drones, issuing a request for countermeasures, per the same source. Defense industry expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi characterised the resulting operational model as a coordinated swarm: rocket-armed escort drones suppress interception teams while heavy-warhead strike drones prosecute primary targets. The parallel Magura V5 naval drone program demonstrates the same development trajectory: after Russia deployed helicopter patrols against the surface drone, Ukraine armed the Magura V5 with R-73 air-to-air missiles, shooting down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter in occupied Crimea in late 2024. The subsequent Magura V7, fitted with AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, shot down two Russian Su-30 fighter-bombers in 2025 — the first manned combat aircraft destroyed by an unmanned surface vessel, per Source 10. **Russian Information Operations and Domestic Conditions** Russia's Federal Security Service conducted approximately 2,000 mobile internet shutdowns per month by end of 2025 — a figure Source 3 characterises as exceeding the total recorded globally across all of 2024. Mobile internet was suspended across Moscow for nearly 21 consecutive days in March 2026 with no public explanation, affecting card payments, navigation applications, and ride-hailing services. Authorities effectively blocked Telegram in April 2026 and launched a state-run replacement called Max, but security shortcomings led authorities to again recommend Telegram for frontline military use within weeks of the platform's launch, per Source 3. State pollster VTsIOM recorded stated public trust in Putin at approximately 78 percent in December 2025; by April 2026, the same pollster placed the figure at 65.6 percent — a decline of 12.2 percentage points described as a wartime low, per Source 3. The Levada Center's independent February 2026 survey found 67 percent of respondents said Russia should move toward peace negotiations. Abbas Gallyamov, described as a former Putin speechwriter now based abroad, told the Wall Street Journal that a domestic sentiment turning point came in January 2026 — the month the Ukraine war exceeded the full duration of the Soviet Union's conflict against Nazi Germany. On Russia's economy, official data cited in Source 3 show GDP contracted 0.3 percent in Q1 2026 — the first such contraction since 2023 — with the Ministry of Economy cutting its full-year 2026 growth forecast from 1.3 percent to 0.4 percent. Business investment has fallen to its lowest level since the pandemic period. Germany's Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, cited in Source 6, assessed that Russia's defense-spending-driven GDP growth stalled during 2024. Russia increased its value-added tax from 20 to 22 percent in January 2026 and is allocating 40 percent of its budget to military and national defense, per Source 6. The Jamestown Foundation, cited in Sources 3 and 6, estimated Russia lost between 90 and 92 percent of arms export revenue between 2021 and 2024, with a more conservative March 2026 analysis cited in Source 3 placing the figure at 64 percent over 2021-2026 — the two estimates are unreconciled across sources. Carnegie Endowment analysis, cited in Source 3, reported Russia's oil exports had declined to 3.5 million barrels per day by early April 2026, against a prior average of 5.2 million barrels per day, attributed to Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure. However, in March 2026, Russia's oil export revenue approximately doubled year-on-year and reached its highest monthly total since 2023, driven by global oil prices rising over 50 percent between February and May 2026 — attributed to the Iran conflict — and the United States waiving sanctions on Russian oil exports during that period to maintain global crude supply, per Source 3. Ukrainian President Zelensky stated in May via Telegram that Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service had obtained internal Russian documents indicating one Russian oil company suspended operations at approximately 400 wells, Russian oil refining volumes fell by at least 10 percent in early 2026, and 11 Russian financial institutions were preparing for liquidation while another 8 carried 'unsolvable' problems — claims Source 3 explicitly flags as lower-tier evidence, attributed solely to Zelensky citing Ukrainian intelligence and not independently confirmed. Smart's reporting in Source 5 cites Interfax as placing Russia's total liquid reserve assets at approximately 48 billion (currency unspecified), with the current burn rate implying depletion in under 90 days. A queue of over 600 vehicles was reported attempting to exit Crimea, alongside shortages of gasoline, oil, water, and restrictions on sugar purchases, per Source 5. On manpower, The Economist is cited in Source 3 as calculating approximately 3 percent of Russia's male population of fighting age killed or wounded by mid-2026. Russia secured approximately 11,000 North Korean troops (reported late 2024) and recruited approximately 1,700 soldiers from African countries including Zimbabwe and Kenya, per Source 3. Putin amended federal law in October 2025 to permit reservist call-up under the existing special military operation designation and shifted to year-round conscription in January 2026. Peter Dickinson (Source 15) cited intelligence estimates suggesting Russia recruits approximately 25,000 to 30,000 personnel per month while losing approximately 35,000. **Russian Information Operations — Historical Record and 2026 Status** Source 6 (The Military Show) provides a detailed account of Russia's disinformation architecture dating to 2014. In July 2014, Russian state broadcaster Channel One — reaching a potential audience of 250 million viewers across former Soviet countries — aired fabricated testimony alleging Ukrainian soldiers had crucified a three-year-old boy in Sloviansk. Independent journalists from Novaya Gazeta and Dozhd found no witnesses, evidence, or documentation; BBC News reported no 'Lenin Square' exists in Sloviansk. The story was traced to Eurasianist philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, who published a version on Facebook on July 9, 2014 — three days before the Channel One broadcast. Journalist Masha Borzunova located the witness in 2021, at which point she said she regretted fabricating the account. At the Lviv Media Forum in mid-May 2026, Andrii Yusov, representative for strategic communications of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence directorate HUR, stated that Russian disinformation penetration of Ukrainian and European information space had become 'significantly smaller' than in 2014, citing what he described as a 'critical reflex' in Ukrainian society, per Source 6. In the first ten days of May 2026, more than 21,600 posts advancing an anti-migrant narrative appeared across approximately 14,000 sources on Ukrainian social media, concentrated on Facebook and Telegram, per the same source — indicating continued active operations despite reduced penetration rates. Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of RT since age 25 in 2005, stated publicly in May 2026 that her children had been sleeping in interior, windowless areas of her Moscow-area home for several weeks due to Ukrainian drone activity — a striking contrast to her 2021 assertion that Russia would defeat Ukraine in two days in any armed conflict, per Source 4. Ukraine's Security Service formally charged Simonyan in 2024, and the U.S. Treasury sanctioned her the same year as part of a response to Kremlin influence operations targeting the American presidential election, per Source 4.
Diplomacy: Zelensky-Putin Standoff, Western Aid Architecture, and U.S. Positioning
The diplomatic landscape is defined by a widening gap between Ukrainian readiness to negotiate from a position of strength and Russian insistence on its maximalist June 2024 war aims as a precondition for any talks. **The Zelensky Letter and Putin's Response** Zelensky published an open letter to Putin declaring Ukraine's readiness for direct talks, a ceasefire, and negotiations without preconditions at any neutral venue, per Sources 9, 11, and 15. CNN highlighted that the letter was released during Putin's St. Petersburg forum press conference and one day after Ukrainian drone strikes on St. Petersburg; The New York Times described it as a public relations maneuver aimed at Trump's attention, per Source 15. Putin, speaking at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, stated he had read the letter but saw no purpose in a direct meeting, characterising the letter as containing 'elements of arrogance' and initially referring to Zelensky only as 'the author' and 'this gentleman,' per Source 11. Putin stated that Russia's strategic objectives set at the launch of the full-scale invasion and reconfirmed in June 2024 remain unchanged, and that the complete seizure of the Donetsk region remains the primary military objective, per Source 11. Zelensky characterised Putin's response as confirming the Kremlin's refusal to end the war and called for a strategy focused on draining Russia's financial resources, per his evening address cited in Source 11. Peter Dickinson (Source 15) assessed that Putin would not meet Zelensky in part because doing so would confer legitimacy on both Zelensky and Ukrainian statehood — positions fundamentally inconsistent with Putin's public doctrine that Ukraine is part of Russia. David Setter, described in Source 9 as a journalist, historian, and former Moscow correspondent, assessed the letter as placing pressure on Trump by taking his stated peace objectives at face value. Trump, when asked whether the two leaders should negotiate without U.S. participation, stated both should 'figure it out themselves,' per Source 11. Bloomberg, cited in Source 9, reported that the leaders of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany plan to convene with Zelensky in London to discuss mechanisms for bringing Russia to negotiations. Putin rejected European mediation, arguing EU states cannot serve as neutral mediators while supplying weapons to Ukraine, per Source 15. Dickinson assessed that Russia's primary foreign policy objective for approximately 70 years has been to divide Europe from the United States, and that Putin views European solidarity as the primary obstacle to Russian objectives. **Western Aid and Legislative Developments** The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill allocating more than $9 billion in assistance to Ukraine, with the vote recorded as 226 in favour and 195 opposed, per Source 9. The allocation includes over $1 billion for security assistance and reconstruction and $8 billion in defense loans. Setter assessed the bill faces significantly less favourable Senate conditions and noted Trump retains veto authority, which he might exercise on foreign policy grounds. The Senate's trajectory on both the Ukraine aid bill and the Iran war powers resolution remains the key near-term legislative variable. NATO member states are preparing a military assistance package for Ukraine valued at 70 billion euros, with formal announcement anticipated at the July NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, per Source 11. The proposal is attributed to Germany and is intended to address unequal financial burden-sharing. Ukrainian officials stated the funds are sought for air defense capabilities, domestic drone and missile manufacturing, and extended-range munitions, per Source 11. European nations have separately formed what Source 3 describes as a Coalition of the Willing to discuss future support including potential direct troop intervention. Zelensky stated in his open letter that the war could continue into 2027 and 2028, citing intelligence data, per Source 15 — a timeline consistent with Dickinson's assessment that Putin retains the option of mass mobilization even as voluntary recruitment lags behind attrition by approximately 5,000 to 10,000 personnel per month.
Bangladesh-India: Structural Frictions Impede Bilateral Reset
Bangladesh-India bilateral relations remain in a state of unresolved tension following the political transition of August 5, 2024, according to Raheed Dizdar, diplomatic correspondent of Prothom Alo, speaking on StratNewsGlobal. Dizdar identified several structural friction points. The continued presence of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in India — where she has given interviews to Indian media described as creating tension in Bangladesh's public sphere — and an outstanding formal extradition request constitute the most acute bilateral irritant, per Dizdar. He noted an International Court of Justice verdict has been issued regarding her role in events of July and August 2024, that grey areas persist within the existing extradition treaty, and that India's avoidance of the question does not constitute resolution. On trade, Dizdar cited his own collected statistics indicating 90 to 95 percent of Indian yarn and cotton imports enter Bangladesh through Chittagong port, with only approximately 5 percent arriving via land routes — contextualising land-port restrictions as having limited trade impact despite political salience. India has also maintained restrictions on transshipment facilities for Bangladesh, per Dizdar. An ongoing agreement to import 200 rail coaches from the Rail Coach Factory in Kapurthala — 104 air-conditioned and 96 non-air-conditioned — funded by the European Investment Bank at approximately $100 million and above, with delivery expected between December 2026 and December 2027, continues to proceed, with discussions underway on an additional 260 broad-gauge coaches, per Dizdar. The Ganges water treaty — a 30-year agreement — expires December 12, 2026, per Dizdar, who described urgency for both sides to begin renegotiation incorporating updated climatic and hydrological data. He identified visa access as the most important immediate issue for India to address, followed by border and water concerns. On social media disinformation, Dizdar characterised Facebook, YouTube, and blog platforms as having been 'used aggressively' in the 18 months following August 2024 to spread false and inflammatory content including edited videos, describing social media as one of the most disruptive factors in the bilateral relationship — a structural parallel to the Russian disinformation dynamics documented across the Ukraine-Russia reporting.
Sources
- YouTube Video PzPsnwI-3ns (commentary on U.S.-Iran negotiations and War Powers)
- YouTube Video viRzbs-SoeA (U.S. Attorney Western District of Texas, immigration sentencing data)
- YouTube Video -mhyNnEKA5M (Russia domestic conditions, Ukraine battlefield, economic analysis)
- YouTube Video 0momvxKsJVQ (Moscow drone strikes, Margarita Simonyan profile)
- YouTube Video treQ64f5orw / Dr. Jason Smart, Kyiv Post (Russian frontline attrition, Crimea)
- The Military Show: Putin's Secret War FAILED in Ukraine (Russian information operations, Operation Spiderweb, economic data)
- Victor Davis Hanson via Jill Michaels program (Iran-Gulf escalation, war powers, oil markets)
- The Military Show: Ukraine Drones (FP-2 rocket-armed drone, fiber-optic FPV, Magura V5/V7)
- War and Politics 24: Chaos in Kremlin (Zelensky-Putin diplomacy, U.S. House Ukraine aid vote)
- War and Politics 24: Right after explosions (St. Petersburg drone strikes, Putin forum remarks, NATO aid package)
- The Rubin Report / Sean Spicer (U.S. domestic politics, Iran framing, 2026 midterm analysis)
- StratNewsGlobal / Raheed Dizdar, Prothom Alo (Bangladesh-India bilateral relations)
- YouTube Video PupWYHKJGz8 / Peter Dickinson, Atlantic Council (Zelensky letter, Russian domestic conditions, European mediation)